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Abstract Current payout policy literature contends that firms’ propensity to pay
dividends declined between 1978 and 1998. Using the Oaxaca decomposition
methodology, we measure changes in the propensity to pay dividends between 1978
and 1998. Results suggest that firms today have only a slightly lower propensity to
pay dividends. Furthermore, when we also categorize firms that use stock
repurchases as dividend payers, we find that 100% of the decline in the proportion
of dividend payers can be explained by changes in firm characteristics only. The
difference is that firms that firms are now repurchasing stock instead of paying
dividends.
Keywords Dividends . Payout Policy . Propensity to Pay . Taxes
JEL Classification G35 . G32 .M41
1 Introduction
Fama and French (2001) document a decrease in the proportion of dividend payers
from 68% in 1978 to 21% in 1998. They argue that because changes in firm
characteristics cannot fully explain the decrease, managers today must have a lower
propensity to pay dividends. Other studies have examined additional firm
characteristic determinants that could explain the decrease in the proportion of
dividend payers. For example, Baker and Wurgler (2004b) use dividend premium,
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Banerjee et al. (2007) use liquidity, and DeAngelo et al. (2006) use the lifecycle
theory to explain the decrease. These studies compare the predicted proportion of
dividend payers using logit regressions to the actual proportion of dividend
payers to determine whether there is a lower propensity to pay dividends. They
then conclude that there is a lower propensity to pay dividends because the
predicted proportion of dividend payers is higher than the actual proportion of
dividend payers. Unfortunately, this methodology does not tell us whether the
decrease in the proportion of dividend payers is due to changes in firm
characteristics, changes in managers’ attitudes toward paying dividends, or the
combination of the two. Using a decomposition methodology commonly used in
discrimination studies, we are able to quantify that about 76% of the decline in
the proportion of dividend payers between 1978 and 1998 can be explained by
changes in firm characteristics.
An alternative hypothesis also suggests that firms have replaced dividend payouts
with stock repurchases (Dittmar and Dittmar (2008) and Brockman et al. (2008)). In
addition, Brockman et al. (2008) also indicate that changes in liquidity may impact
dividend policy. Surprisingly, when we categorize firms that use stock repurchases
as dividend payers, we find that 100% of the decline in the proportion of dividend
payers can be explained by changes in firm characteristics alone. In other words, our
results show that there is not a lower propensity to pay dividends.
In addition to firm characteristics, we also consider factors that could affect firms’
payout policies, such as tax rate differentials and dividend premium. Historically,
dividends have been taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, suggesting that fewer firms
should pay dividends when the tax rate on dividends is higher than the tax rate on capital
gains. To measure the impact that taxes have on dividend policy, the literature often
analyzes specific periods when firms are indifferent between paying and not paying
dividends. Previous studies such as Eades et al. (1994) and Michaely (1991) find that
taxes do not significantly affect the decision to pay dividends. More recently, Chetty
and Saez (2005) found that a large number of firms started paying dividends following
the Bush tax cut of 2001. By looking at the difference between the maximum tax rate
on dividends and the maximum tax rate on capital gains, we find results supporting
the conclusion that taxes has insignificant impact on dividend policy.
More recently, Baker and Wurgler (2004a, b) show that the dividend premium
affects dividend policy. In essence, they suggest that firms are more willing to pay
dividends when the stock market places higher valuation on dividend paying firms
than on non-dividend paying firms. Thus, firms should be more likely to pay
dividends if the market-to-book ratio of dividend paying firms is higher than that of
non-dividend paying firms. They find that firms are more (less) likely to pay
dividends when the dividend premium is high (low). However, our results suggest
that the dividend premium is insignificant in explaining the decrease in the
proportion of dividend payers.
Our study contributes to the literature in a couple of ways. First and foremost, this is the
first study, to our knowledge, that quantitatively measures how much recent changes in
dividend policy can be explained by changes in firm characteristics and by changes in
managerial attitudes towards dividend policy. Ours is also the first to explore the effect of
stock repurchases on the change in dividend policy between 1978 and 1998. Our study
strongly suggests that there is not a lower propensity to pay dividends in that period.
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2 Data and sample selection
We use the traditional determinants of dividend policy (such as size, profitability,
and growth opportunities) and more recently used determinants (such as age of the
firm, dividend premium, leverage, the earned/contributed capital mix, and liquidity).
For example, Lintner (1956), Fama and French (2001), and many others suggest that
size, profitability, and growth opportunities help explain dividend policy. Faulkender
et al. (2006), along with Fama and French (2002), find that there is a negative
relation between leverage and dividend policy. Banerjee et al. (2007) show that firms
with liquid shares are less likely to pay dividends than firms with illiquid shares.
This is because when shareholders of liquid shares need cash, they can sell shares
more easily than shareholders of illiquid shares. Since markets have become more
liquid over time, it makes sense to include this factor as a possible determinant of the
decline in the proportion of dividend payers between 1978 and 1998.
Another hypothesis that has gained much attention has to do with the firm
lifecycle. Grullon et al. (2002) show that firms are more likely to pay dividends as
they mature because firm age is correlated with other dividend policy determinants
that are difficult to measure (such as growth opportunities and excess cash holdings).
Previous studies define maturity as age of the firms since their listings in CRSP
(Center for Research in Security Prices) database. This measure, CRSP maturity,
underestimates the contribution firm maturity has on the likelihood that a firm pays
dividends because firms are now listing their stock on an exchange earlier in their
lifecycle. We propose that age of the firms since their years of incorporation (i.e.
incorporation maturity) is a better measure of firm maturity. Fink et al. (2004) find
that, “the age of the typical firm at its IPO date has fallen dramatically from nearly
40 years old in the early 1960s to less than 5 years old by the late 1990s”.
Combining this fact with evidence that older firms typically have fewer growth
opportunities, it follows that firms may have become less likely to pay dividends in
the 1990s than in 1960s simply because firms in 1990s, on average, are younger.
Using the retained earnings to total equity ratio of DeAngelo et al. (2006), we
confirm that this factor indeed explains a large portion of the decline in the
proportion of dividends in the 1978–1998 period.
The last hypothesis we test in this paper has to do with catering to investor
demand for dividends. Specifically, Baker and Wurgler (2004a, b) show that the
dividend premium is a dividend policy determinant. They suggest that firms are
more likely to pay dividends when the stock market shows higher valuation for
dividend paying firms. Their results show that firms are more (less) likely to pay
dividends when the dividend premium is high (low). The dividend premium is
calculated as the log difference between the market/book ratios of dividend payers
and non-dividend payers.
Like Fama and French (2001), we “exclude firms with book equity below $250,000
or assets below $500,000.” In regards to assets, we calculate growth of assets before
discarding firms whose assets are less than $500,000. We exclude firms not in the CRSP
database at its fiscal year-end. Because of their unique characteristics, we exclude
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). Consistent
with Fama and French (2001), we measure firm size in a given year as the percentage
of firms with equal or lower market capitalization in the NYSE.
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We use two measures of maturity. The first measure is the age of the firm since it
first appeared in the CRSP database. Second, we obtain the age of the firm since its
incorporation from Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) and by hand-collecting any
missing gaps using various issues of the Mergent’s industrial manual, bank &
finance manual, and OTC manual, all published by Moody’s Investors Service. We
present the descriptive statistics in Table 1.
We contrast the two measures of maturity in Table 2. CRSP maturity ranges from
8 years to 16 years between 1966 and 2001 with a slight increase between 2002 and
2007. Incorporation maturity ranges from 24 years to 36 years with a decreasing
trend between 1978 and 1997 and an increasing trend between 1998 and 2007. The
percentage difference between the CRSP maturity and the incorporation maturity
decreases with time, providing evidence that firms are now listing their stock earlier
in their lifecycles. Thus, CRSP maturity may be a biased measure of firm maturity,
especially in the early part of our sample.
In addition to firm characteristics, we also look at the factors that affect all firms
equally such as the tax rate differential (i.e. the difference between the maximum
ordinary and maximum capital gains tax rates) and the dividend premium (i.e. the
log difference between the market-to-book ratios of dividend payers and those of
non-dividend payers). Since dividends are normally taxed at a higher rate than
capital gains, the differential is normally positive, however, as we can see from
Table 3, this differential can be zero following the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986
and the Bush tax cut of 2001.
3 Decomposition methodology
Fama and French (2001) document a dramatic decrease in the proportion of dividend
payers from 1978 to 1998. Firms in 1978 were more likely to pay dividends than
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Observations Mean 25th percentile Median 75th percentile Std. Dev.
Size 114616 23.510 1.625 9.521 36.232 27.299
E/A 138133 0.005 0.018 0.069 0.103 0.225
dA/A 141237 0.156 −0.019 0.085 0.231 0.342
V/A 144676 1.763 0.952 1.232 1.874 1.726
Maturity 90520 30.131 11 22 44 25.810
LEV 143696 0.261 0.083 0.231 0.384 0.259
LIQ 137698 17.317 14.391 16.581 18.829 3.228
RE/TE 133006 0.142 0.021 0.435 0.702 1.297
Div. Premium 144676 −23.4 −26.442 −20.597 −14.526 11.014
This table presents summary statistics for all variables used in this study. The variables include relative
size of the firm compared to the average NYSE firm (Size), profitability (E/A), asset growth (dA/A),
market-to-book ratio (V/A), age of the firm since incorporation (Maturity), book value leverage (LEV),
number of shares traded during the year divided by shares outstanding (LIQ), earned/contributed capital
mix (RE/TE), and the dividend premium described in Baker and Wurgler (2004b)
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those in 1998. The 1998 firms were smaller, less profitable, younger, and had more
growth opportunities than firms in 1978. However, no attempt was made to quantify
how much of these changes in firm characteristics can explain the decrease in the
likelihood to pay dividends. Fama and French (2001) propose looking at changes in
firm characteristics directly to try to determine whether they could explain the
decline in the proportion of dividend payers between 1978 (firms in 1978 could be
interpreted as group A) and 1998 (firms in 1998 could be interpreted as group B).
However, instead of analytically determining how much of the decline in the
proportion of dividend payers is explained by these changes, they propose their
alternative solution (used in subsequent studies of the propensity to pay dividends),
which compares the actual proportion of dividend payers to the predicted proportion
of dividend payers. This alternative methodology does not directly looks at how
much of the decline is due to changes in firm characteristics and how much is due to
changes in managers’ attitudes to dividends.
This problem is very similar to the income inequality problem. Suppose that
group A earns more money than group B and that group A has more education and
Table 2 Comparison of different maturity measures
Years Incorporation maturity CRSP maturity Difference Percentage difference
1966–1967 36.73 11.285 25.45 226%
1968–1969 36.365 11.12 25.245 227%
1970–1971 36.1 11.41 24.685 217%
1972–1973 33.355 8.31 25.045 301%
1974–1975 33.575 9.395 24.175 258%
1976–1977 34.66 10.8 23.855 221%
1978–1979 34.55 12.065 22.48 187%
1980–1981 34.42 12.92 21.5 167%
1982–1983 32.875 12.985 19.895 153%
1984–1985 31.185 12.89 18.295 142%
1986–1987 29.585 12.615 16.97 135%
1988–1989 29.545 13.21 16.325 124%
1990–1991 29.495 13.71 15.775 115%
1992–1993 27.695 12.96 14.735 114%
1994–1995 26.26 12.345 13.915 113%
1996–1997 24.86 11.745 13.115 112%
1998–1999 25.56 12.44 13.12 106%
2000–2001 26.33 13.315 13.14 98%
2002–2003 29.066 15.445 13.585 88%
2004–2005 31.88 16.245 13.89 96%
2006–2007 33.21 15.77 13.01 111%
This table summarizes the difference between the two measures of maturity. Incorporation maturity is age
of the firm since it was incorporated. CRSP maturity is the number of years since the firm first appeared
on the CRSP files. The numbers represent the average across all firms for a given year. The difference
column is the difference between the two maturity measures. The percentage is the percentage difference
between the two measures
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experience than group B. How much of the earnings gap is explained by differences
in their characteristics (such as education and experience) and how much of the gap
is explained by discrimination. This question is of incredible importance. Oaxaca
(1973) proposed a clean solution to the problem and the solution is now commonly
found in basic econometrics textbooks (e.g., Greene 2007). The explained portion of
the gap (that is due to the differences between the two groups) is simply the
differences in characteristics between the two groups multiplied by a vector of fixed
sensitivities of characteristics to earnings. The unexplained portion of the gap (which
could be due to discrimination) is the differences between the sensitivities of
characteristics to earnings between the two groups multiplied by fixed character-
istics. The original Oaxaca decomposition was developed for linear regression
models (such as OLS). Because the dependent variable in our study is a binary
variable (i.e. a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when a firm pays dividends and 0
otherwise), we use the modified version of the Oaxaca decomposition that allows for
binary dependent variables derived in Even and MacPherson (1990). Specifically,
we compare changes in firm characteristics and changes in betas directly and
Table 3 Tax and dividend premium data
Years Ordinary Capital gains Tax differential Dividend premium
1967–1968 73% 26% 47% −17.535
1969–1970 70% 30% 41% 0.535
1971–1972 70% 35% 35% 8.745
1973–1974 70% 37% 34% 3.385
1975–1976 70% 38% 32% −0.025
1977–1978 70% 40% 30% −13.885
1979–1980 70% 28% 42% −45.665
1981–1982 50% 20% 30% −45.395
1983–1984 50% 20% 30% −39.565
1985–1986 50% 20% 30% −36.675
1987–1988 28% 28% 0% −32.25
1989–1990 28% 28% 0% −25.93
1991–1992 33% 29% 4% −40.99
1993–1994 40% 29% 10% −31.78
1995–1996 40% 29% 10% −42.54
1997–1998 40% 29% 10% −20.565
1999–2000 40% 29% 10% −52.745
2001–2002 29% 20% 10% −14.96
2003–2004 20% 20% 0% −22.615
2005–2006 20% 20% 0% −14.365
2007–2007 20% 20% 0% −14.07
The tax numbers represent maximum marginal tax rates in year t. Dividends are normally taxed at the
ordinary tax rate while gains on holding shares of stock are taxed at the capital gains tax rate. The dividend
premium is calculated based on Baker and Wurgler (2004b). It is defined as the difference between the
natural logarithms of the dividend payers and non-payers’ market-to-book ratios (times 100)
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analytically to determine how much of the decline can be explained by changes in
firm characteristics and how much can be explained by changes in the managers’
attitudes towards paying dividends.
The following helps explain why the model used to predict dividend payers is of
critical importance to this study: Suppose we were trying to explain why group A
earns more money than group B. Assume group A has more education than group B.
If we did not control for this effect, results from the Oaxaca decomposition would
lead us to conclude that discrimination is larger than it really is.
The first step in the decomposition analysis involves estimation of the probability
that a firm i is a dividend payer at time t given firm characteristics Xit using a probit
model:
Pr Dit ¼ 1 Xitjð Þ ¼ Φ Xitbð Þ ð1Þ
Where Xit is the vector of firm characteristics (e.g. size, investment opportunities,
and profitability) describing firm i at time t. Dit=1 indicates that the firm is a
dividend payer. β is a vector of parameters and Φ is the standard normal cumulative
density function.
Given the estimates for β for two time periods (t=1, 2), an unbiased predictor of
the fraction of dividend payers in period t is given by:
Pˆt ¼ 1=ntð Þ
Xnt
i¼1
Φ Xit bˆt
 
; where nt is the sample size in period t; ð2Þ
The decrease in the proportion of dividend payers is now decomposed following
the methodologies of Oaxaca (1973) and of Even and MacPherson (1990). First, we
divide the change in the proportion of dividend payers into that which can be
explained by changes in firm characteristics (EXPX) and that which cannot be
explained by firm characteristics (EXPβ). More specifically, EXPβ is the variation
that cannot be explained by changes in firm characteristics corresponds to changes in
the β coefficients. The breakdown of the change in the proportion of dividend
payers can be expressed by:
Pˆ1 Pˆ2 ¼ EXPX þ EXPb ð3Þ
The portion explained by changes in the firm characteristics (EXPX) is the change
in the proportion of dividend payers that would occur if the coefficients on the
determinants of dividend policy (βs) are fixed in period one, while allowing for firm
characteristics (Xs) to change from period one to period two. For example, we
calculate the change in the proportion of dividend payers in 1978 versus in 2000.
Suppose coefficients on the firm characteristics (βs) do not change between the two
periods. Then the change in the proportion of dividend payers will be solely due to
changes in firm characteristics (Xs). We compute EXPX as:
EXPX ¼ 1=n1ð Þ
Xn1
i¼1
6 Xi1bˆ1
 " #
 1=n2ð Þ
Xn2
i¼1
6 Xi2 bˆ1
 " #
ð4Þ
The portion explained by changes in the coefficients on the firm characteristics
(EXPβ) is the change in the proportion of dividend payers that would occur if firm
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characteristics (Xs) are fixed in period two, while allowing for coefficients on firm
characteristics (βs) to change from period one to period two. For example, we
calculate the change in the proportion of dividend payers in 1978 vs. in 2000.
Suppose firm characteristics (Xs) do not change between the two periods. Then the
change in the proportion of dividend payers will be solely due to changes in
coefficients on firm characteristics (βs). We compute EXPβ as:
EXPb ¼ 1=n2ð Þ
Xn2
i¼1
6 Xi2 bˆ1
 " #
 1=n2ð Þ
Xn2
i¼1
6 Xi2 bˆ2
 " #
ð5Þ
By construction, the sum of EXPX and EXPβ will add up to the change in the
predicted proportions of dividend payers between periods one and two. The
proportion explained by changes in the firm characteristics can be further
decomposed to measure the contribution of each of the relevant firm
characteristics. The fraction of EXPX due to changes in the jth explanatory variable
is defined as:
EXPXj ¼ EXPX X j2  X j1
 
bˆj1
h i.
X 2  X 1
 
bˆ1
h i
ð6Þ
Whereas EXPX is defined above, X j2 is the mean of the j
th firm characteristic for
the firms in the second period, and X 2 is a vector of the mean characteristics for the
firms in period two.
By construction,
P
j EXP
X
j ¼ EXPX as it should. That is, the sum of the contributions
of each of the firm characteristics adds up to the portion explained by changes in firm
characteristics. In addition, the amount explained by the jth explanatory variable is
related to the change in the mean value of Xj, and its impact on the probability of paying
dividends (βj).
4 Multivariate statistics
There is an advantage of running year-by-year cross-sectional regressions as in Fama
and French (2001). Year-by-year cross-sectional regressions allow us to see whether
firms change the way they determine dividend policy over time. However, year-by-
year cross-sectional regressions require macroeconomic factors to be excluded. Since
it is at least plausible that changes in macroeconomic factors (such as tax rate
differential and the dividend premium) explain part of the lower propensity to pay
dividends, we must also analyze the impact of macroeconomic factors on dividend
policy by using pooled regressions. However, the problem with pooled regressions is
that regression coefficients are forced to be constant over time. Changing
coefficients indicate that decision makers think differently about the effect of firm
characteristics on the likelihood to pay dividends from year to year. The direction of
the change reflects the propensity to pay dividends in a given year. In this section we
present results using both pooled and year-by-year cross-sectional regressions.
One concern with the tax differential is that it seems to be highly negatively
correlated with time. As we can see in Table 3, tax differential (column four) is
highly negatively correlated with time (column one). Thus, any regression in which
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the tax differential is an independent variable may result in spurious significant
results unless time is also included.1
4.1 Pooled regressions
We first run pooled probit regressions in order to measure the effect of
macroeconomic factors on the likelihood that a firm will pay dividends. As
explained above, pooled regressions do not allow coefficients to change across time.
In Table 4, we present regression results in which we include all factors we test in
this paper, year dummies, and interaction terms between the firm characteristic
variables and the year dummies. That is, we run the following regression:
Pr Dit¼1 Xitjð Þ
¼6 aþb Xitð Þþg Div: Premiumð Þþd Tax Differentialð Þþe Yr: Dummiesð Þþz Xit Yr Dummiesð Þ½ 
ð7Þ
To save space, we present results for average coefficients on the interaction terms
with their corresponding t-statistics. This practice is similar to that of Fama and
Macbeth (1973). First, all coefficients, except leverage, have the predicted sign. All
coefficients are statistically significant at 10% level. Notice that most interaction
terms are significantly different from zero, indicating that the coefficients on firm
characteristics are varying with time. Still, it is impossible to determine whether
there was a lower propensity to pay dividends just by looking at the interaction
terms.
4.2 Year-by-year cross-sectional regressions
In Table 5 we present results from year by year cross-sectional probit regressions on
the likelihood that a firm pays dividends for each year between 1967 and 2002. To
conserve space, we present only five-year average coefficients. We can see the signs
of the coefficients of the regressions are consistent with the findings of Fama and
French (2001).
The firm size variable has a significantly positive coefficient for all years. This is
because bigger firms normally have less cash flow volatility and therefore are more
confident in being able to continue paying dividends in the future. An increase in
investment opportunities (indicated by higher V/A or higher dA/A) reduces the
probability that the firm will pay dividends since the firm can invest the money
elsewhere. The sporadic lack of significance of the coefficient on asset growth may
be due to the collinearity with V/A. The relation between profitability and dividends
is as expected. As profitability increases, the probability of paying dividends also
increases (as evidenced by a positive E/A coefficient). However, the importance of
profitability for the average firm decreases over time. Age of firm turns out to be a
significant variable in explaining the dividend payout and it is consistently
significant over years. The earned/contributed capital mix variable that is introduced
by DeAngelo et al. (2006) also explains dividend policy very well and like firm age,
1 The correlation between the tax differential and time was so strong that our statistical analysis program
automatically dropped it.
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this variable is consistently significant over years. Although leverage has the correct
sign, it is sporadically significant and it becomes less significant over time. Finally,
our year by year cross-sectional probit regression results support the conclusion of
Banerjee et al. (2007) that liquidity is negatively related to the likelihood that a firm
pays dividends.
Coefficients on profitability, growth opportunities, firm size, liquidity, leverage,
earned/contributed capital mix, and liquidity coefficients in 1967–1972 are very
different from those in the 1998–2002 period. For example, the profitability
coefficient changes from 2.164 (in 1967–1972) to 0.289 (in 1998–2002). This
suggests that the same profitable firm that pays dividends between 1967 and 1972 is
less likely to pay dividends between 1998 and 2002. This phenomenon is part of the
Table 4 Likelihood of paying dividends: Do coefficients on firm characteristics change across time?
Pr Dit ¼ 1 Xitjð Þ
Coefficient T-statistic p-value
E/A 0.5501 4.550 (<0.001)
dA/A −0.0610 −3.060 (0.002)
SIZE 0.0071 1.750 (0.081)
V/A −0.0620 −16.920 (<0.001)
MAT 0.0037 41.700 (<0.001)
RE/TE 0.0485 2.730 (0.006)
LEV 0.0889 3.320 (0.001)
LIQ −0.0333 −22.740 (<0.001)
E/A interaction 0.4269 3.368 (<0.001)
dA/A interaction −0.0335 −3.348 (0.008)
SIZE interaction 0.0026 8.533 (<0.001)
V/A interaction −0.0051 −1.131 (<0.001)
MAT interaction 0.0033 7.184 (<0.001)
RE/TE interaction 0.1936 7.321 (<0.001)
LEV interaction −0.1309 −10.386 (<0.001)
LIQ interaction −0.0084 −3.721 (0.147)
Dividend premium 1.4631 6.810 (<0.001)
Observations 62,887
We test whether the coefficients on firm characteristics change over time and present the results of the test
on this table. The dependent variable is equal to one if a firm pays dividends in year t and zero otherwise.
The explanatory variables are relative size of the firm compared to the average size of NYSE firm (SIZE),
market-to-book ratio (V/A), asset growth (dA/A), profitability (E/A), age of the firm since incorporation
(MAT), earned/contributed capital mix (RE/TE), book value leverage (LEV) and the ratio of shares traded
during the year to shares outstanding (LIQ). We also include time dummy variables and interaction terms
between the firm characteristics variables and the year dummies. In other words, we run Pr Dit ¼ 1 Xitjð Þ ¼
6 aþ b Xitð Þ þ g Dividend Premiumð Þ þ d TaxDifferentialð Þ þ e Year Dummiesð Þ þ z Xit  Year Dummiesð Þð Þ.
For the interaction terms, we present average coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics in a similar
fashion to Fama and Macbeth (1973). The tax differential variable was dropped automatically by the
statistical analysis program because of collinearity with the year dummy variables. The year t regressions
are estimated for firms with available data items on Compustat (see Table 1 for more details).
452 J Econ Finan (2012) 36:443–462
reason many have said that there is now a lower propensity to pay dividends. On the
other hand, the coefficients on firm maturity are relatively stable over time (0.004 for
the 1967–1972 period compared to 0.002 for the 1998–2002 period). An alternative
explanation that we also consider in this study is that macroeconomic forces have
had an increasing effect on the likelihood that a firm will pay dividends. However,
we cannot be sure based on year-by-year cross-sectional regressions because
macroeconomic forces cannot enter these regressions. Either way, the apparent
changes in coefficients alone do not allow us to determine whether there is in fact a
lower propensity to pay dividends. We need the Oaxaca decomposition to help us
measure the aggregate effects of changing coefficients compared to the aggregate
effects of changing firm characteristics.
5 Decomposition results
As discussed earlier, the Oaxaca decomposition allows us to quantitatively determine
how much firm characteristics or managerial attitudes explain the decline in the
proportion of dividend payers between 1978 and 1998. One characteristic of the
Table 5 Summary of probit regressions
Coefficients (p-value)
SIZEt V/At dA/At E/At MATt RE/TEt LEVt LIQt
1967–1972 0.010 −0.071 −0.192 2.164 0.004 0.303 −0.234 −0.080
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000)
1973–1977 0.013 −0.100 −0.091 1.206 0.004 0.536 −0.118 −0.074
(0.000) (0.006) (0.205) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000)
1978–1982 0.010 −0.114 −0.105 1.164 0.005 0.499 −0.159 −0.017
(0.000) (0.003) (0.073) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.023)
1983–1987 0.012 −0.060 −0.175 0.719 0.006 0.341 −0.062 −0.038
(0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.365) (0.000)
1988–1992 0.011 −0.047 −0.163 0.718 0.005 0.164 −0.061 −0.037
(0.000) (0.002) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.168) (0.000)
1993–1997 0.007 −0.033 −0.131 0.376 0.003 0.089 −0.039 −0.031
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.164) (0.000)
1998–2002 0.004 −0.026 −0.098 0.289 0.002 0.040 0.004 −0.019
(0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.016) (0.851) (0.008)
We run probit regressions on the likelihood that a firm pays dividends for each year between 1967 and
2002. To conserve space, we present only five-year average coefficients and p-values (in parentheses) in
this table (the full probit regression results are available upon request). The dependent variable in each
regression is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if firm i pays dividends in year t and zero otherwise. The
explanatory variables are relative size of the firm, compared to the average NYSE firm (SIZE), market-to-
book ratio (V/A), asset growth (dA/A), profitability (E/A), earned/contributed capital mix (RE/TE), book
value leverage (LEV), shares traded during the year divided by the number of shares outstanding (LIQ),
and age of the firm since incorporation (MAT). The year t regressions are estimated for firms with
available data items on Compustat (see Table 1 for more details)
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Oaxaca decomposition is that it is used to explain differences between two groups.
Thus, we focus primarily on comparing 1978 to 1998 because 1978 is the year in
which the highest proportion of firms paid dividends in the Compustat sample and
1998 is the year in which the lowest proportion of firms paid dividends in the
Compustat sample. Thus, the largest change in the proportion of dividend payers
happens between these 2 years. However, to check whether choice of year matters in
the analysis, we compare 1978 vs. 1998, 1977 vs. 1998, 1979 vs. 1998, 1978 vs.
1997, and 1978 vs. 1999. We find the choice of year does not seem to affect the
main conclusions. We present multiple specifications to correspond to the different
variables that could explain the trend in dividend policy. First, we use the
specification in Fama and French (2001) and we refer to it as the FF specification
hereafter. We then use FF specification and add firm maturity and earned/contributed
capital mix to the specification. Finally, we use the FF specification and more
recently used dividend policy determinants.
5.1 FF specification
Table 6 shows results of the Oaxaca decomposition with the FF specification.
Specifically, the FF specification assumes that firm size, growth opportunities,
and profitability are the most important factors that affect the likelihood that a
firm pays dividends. The difference between the predicted proportion of dividend
payers in the early year and the later year is about 46.03% (69.38–23.35%).
Furthermore, more than 55% of the decline in the proportion of dividend payers
is due to changes in firm characteristics (25.41% divided by 46.03% implying
that about 55% of the decline in the proportion of dividend payers is explained
by changes in firm characteristics). Changes in growth opportunities (V/A) and
profitability (E/A) are essentially the only firm characteristics explaining the
decline in the proportion of firms that pay dividends between 1978 and 1998.
Changes in profitability explain about 32% of the decline (14.81% divided by
46.03%) whereas changes in growth opportunities explain about 23% of the
decline (10.75% divided by 46.03%).
To further analyze the effect that macroeconomic forces have on the likelihood
that firms pay dividends, we regress the change in the proportion that cannot be
explained by firm characteristics (EXPβ) on the dividend premium of Baker and
Wurgler (2004b) and the tax differential between the maximum capital gains and
the maximum ordinary tax rates. We do this because changes in EXPβ may be
associated with changes in macroeconomic forces. In other words, macroeconomic
forces may alter managers’ attitudes towards firm characteristics in determining
dividend policy. The EXPβ vector is constructed by comparing 1978 to every year
between 1967 and 2007.2 We examine whether changes in EXPβ are related to
2 The analysis of macroeconomic factors and dividend policy is done as a second stage after running the
Oaxaca decomposition. Specifically, we are studying the relationship between the unexplained portion in
the Oaxaca decomposition and macroeconomic factors. Because both the unexplained proportion and
macroeconomic factors are the same across all firms, we only have one observation per year. Conclusions
from these results should therefore be made with caution. We run this analysis for robustness but the
power in the analysis is small because of the low number of observations.
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macroeconomic factors. If tax differential affects the likelihood that a firm pays
dividends, an increase in the tax differential, ceteris paribus, will lead to fewer
dividend-paying firms. Thus, if the tax differential affects the likelihood that a firm
pays dividends, we should see a positive relation between tax differential and
EXPβ. On the other hand, if the dividend premium affects the likelihood that a firm
pays dividends, an increase in the dividend premium, ceteris paribus, will lead to
more dividend-paying firms. Thus, if the dividend premium affects the likelihood
that a firm pays dividends, we should see a negative relation between the dividend
premium and EXPβ.
As we can see in panel B of Table 6, the only consistent and significant
coefficient is that of the dividend premium and only when the dividend premium is
the only independent variable in the regression. After including the tax differential,
the dividend premium, and a time control variable, the coefficients of interest are
either insignificant, or have an incorrect sign. Therefore, we conclude that
macroeconomic factors have not caused managers to be less likely to pay dividends
in 1998 compared to 1978.
5.2 The lifecycle hypothesis and the decline in the proportion of dividend payers
between 1978 and 1998
Grullon et al. (2002) show that growth opportunities fade with time, making it more
likely that a firm will begin paying dividends as it gets older. Along the same lines,
firms mature at different rates. DeAngelo et al. (2006) tests the lifecycle theory with
earned/contributed capital mix and find that it is likely that changes in average firm
maturity between 1978 and 1998 seem to explain a large portion of the decline in the
proportion of dividend payers during that same period. To control for the lifecycle
hypothesis, we add age of a firm since its incorporation and earned/contributed
capital mix to the FF specification. We present the decomposition results with these
new variables in Table 7.
As before, the choice of comparison years does not seem to dramatically affect
results. About 68% (32.23% divided by 47.06%) of the decline in the proportion of
dividend payers between 1978 and 1998 can be explained by changes in firm
characteristics. Specifically, changes in earned/contributed capital (RE/TE) turn out
to explain most of the decline in the proportion of dividend payers. Changes in
RE/TE explain about 51% of the decrease in the proportion of dividend payers
(23.87% divided by 47.06%). Changes in profitability (E/A) explain about 10% of
the decline, changes in growth opportunities (V/A) can explain about 7% of the
decline, and changes in maturity can explain a modest 2% of the decline.3
As before, we examine whether macroeconomic factors have an effect on the
lower propensity to pay dividends by regressing EXPβ on the tax differential and the
dividend premium. As before, we find that the signs of the coefficients incorrect or
that the coefficients insignificant.
3 Considering that it is possible that the effect of maturity is non-linear (in other words, it is possible that
the effect of maturity on the likelihood that a firm pays dividends levels off at some point), we rerun the
decomposition analysis and include the square of maturity as an independent variable in the regressions. In
unreported results, we find that there is no material impact on results when we add the square of maturity.
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5.3 Leverage, liquidity, and the decline in the proportion of dividend payers
between 1978 and 1998
It is possible that changes in liquidity could have caused a decline in the proportion
of firms that pay dividends. Recent work by Banerjee et al. (2007) suggests that the
dramatic rise in liquidity that took place in the last 40 years may explain a significant
part of the decline in the proportion of dividends. The reason is simple. Investors
with regular liquidity needs can receive cash from dividends or by selling shares.
The problem is that selling shares costs money. The cost of selling shares is
inversely related to liquidity. As liquidity increases, preference for dividends falls.
Probably the most important liquidity event for this study is the deregulation of
brokerage commissions that took place in May of 1975. Before this date, all
brokerage houses charged the same commission for buying and selling of stock.
While it took some time, commissions for buying and selling of stock fell
dramatically after the act. We use the Oaxaca decomposition technique to measure
the effect of increasing liquidity on the decline in the proportion of dividend payers.
We also control for leverage in this model because extant literature has found that
capital structure and dividends are interrelated.
Following Banerjee et al. (2007), we use the number of shares traded during the
year divided by the total shares outstanding for the firm as our measure of liquidity.
We add leverage and liquidity to the previous decomposition specification (whose
results are presented in Table 7). The new results are presented in Table 8. The first
surprising result here is that changes in firm characteristics now explain about 76%
of the decline in the proportion of dividend payers between 1978 and 1998 (36.27%
divided by 47.82%). As in Table 6, earned/contributed capital mix still dominates
other determinants. This time, the choice of years is critical, especially with the LIQ
variable. While brokerage commission deregulation happened inMay of 1975, it seems
that liquidity increased dramatically between 1977 and 1979. Thus, results from the
decomposition are very different if we look at the 1977 vs. 1998 period compared to the
1978 vs. 1998 and the 1979 vs. 1998 periods. The effect of liquidity falls dramatically if
we use 1978 as a point of reference instead of 1977 (the contribution of liquidity drops
from 27% to 7% just because of the choice of reference year).
As before, we also explore whether EXPβ is correlated to macroeconomic factors.
Results in this part of the analysis are consistent with earlier results that
macroeconomic factors have not caused the decline in the proportion of dividend
payers between 1978 and 1998 since the coefficients on the dividend premium and
tax differential are either insignificant or have incorrect signs.
6 Stock repurchases
Another question that arises is whether the recent increase in share repurchases has an
effect on the likelihood that firms pay dividends. To test this possibility, we re-run the
decomposition, except that we now identify a firm as a dividend payer if they paid
dividends in year t or if they repurchased stock in year t. This time, we cannot look at the
effects of macroeconomic factors we explored earlier because those factors are related
strictly to firms that pay cash dividends. Results of this analysis are presented in Table 9.
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Note that the likelihood a firm pays dividends is the same in 1978 as it was in
Table 8. This is because our data indicate that firms start repurchasing in the early
1980s. On the other hand, the predicted proportion of dividend payers in 1998 is
higher in Table 9 than in Table 8 (38.21% in Table 9 vs. 25.49% in Table 8) because
dividend payers include firms that repurchase stock in Table 9, but not in Table 8.
The first dramatic result is that firm characteristics now explain more than 100% of
the decline in the proportion of dividend payers between 1978 and 1998. In other
words, firm characteristics changed so much between 1978 and 1998 that firms
should have been even less likely to pay dividends in 1998 than they did.
This result implies that there was actually a higher propensity to pay dividends in
1998 than in 1978 after controlling for repurchase activity. Not surprisingly, the most
important factor that explains the decline in the proportion of dividend payers is earned/
contributed capital mix, followed by profitability, growth opportunities, and then
liquidity. Changes in earned/contributed capital mix explain about 68% (24.69% divided
by 36.26%) of the decline in the proportion of dividend payers between 1978 and 1998,
changes in profitability explain about 14% of the decline (4.99% divided by 36.26%),
changes in growth opportunities explain 9% of the decline (3.32% divided by 36.26%),
changes in liquidity explain 7% of the decline (2.63% divided by 36.26%), and changes
in firm maturity explain about 3% of the decline (1.01% divided by 36.26%).
7 Conclusions
We contribute to the payout policy literature by quantifying how much of the decline in
the proportion of dividend payers can be explained by the so called lower propensity to
pay dividends. We also measure the impact of more recently used dividend policy
determinants on observed payout policy trends. Using the Oaxaca decomposition
methodology to determine whether changes in dividend policy between 1978 and 1998
can be explained by changes in firm characteristics, we find that changes in the
traditional determinants of dividend policy can explain about 55% of the decline in the
proportion of dividend payers that took place between 1978 and 1998. We explore the
effects that firm age and earned/contributed capital mix have on the observed dividend
policy trend. We find that adding those two new variables cause the propensity to pay
dividends to be even less significant (from 45% to 32%). Furthermore, when we add
leverage and liquidity to our decomposition analysis, the propensity to pay dividends
again drops from 32% to 24%, which indicates that changes in firm characteristics can
explain 76% of the decline in the proportion of dividend payers between 1978 and 1998.
Finally, we examine the effect of share repurchases on the decline. This time, we find
that essentially 100% of the decline in the proportion of dividend payers between 1978
and 1998 can be explained by changes in firm characteristics. In fact, we find a slightly
higher propensity to pay dividends in 1998 compared to 1978.
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